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The Philippines had planned to establish a code of conduct with China for the South China Sea during its 2026 ASEAN presidency, but had to abandon this goal at the Manila summit in mid-November. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro stated that around 80% of the text had been negotiated, but key areas of dispute remained unsolved.
Strategic and Economic Stakes
The South China Sea serves as a crucial global shipping route, contains rich fishing grounds, and potentially holds significant oil and gas reserves. The region is also a theater of strategic competition, where China claims a large portion of the sea through its Nine-Dash Line, overlapping with the claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. A code of conduct aims to establish rules for parties and prevent maritime incidents from escalating, though opinions differ on its binding nature and geographic scope.
Andreas Ufen, a Southeast Asia expert at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), told Deutsche Welle: “The basic problem with establishing such a code of conduct is that China is supremely powerful and has no real interest in a legally binding agreement.” Ufen noted that Beijing has little incentive to impose restrictions while able to pursue its regional interests without an agreement.
Binding Nature and Key Disagreements
Felix Heiduk, head of the Asia research division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), highlighted that a fundamental issue is the lack of consensus on whether the code should be legally binding after 12 years of negotiations between China and ASEAN nations. While China and other ASEAN countries harbor reservations about international ratification, Ufen explained to Deutsche Welle that a non-binding code would amount to little more than a voluntary declaration of intent.
Disagreements also extend to geographic scope, such as Vietnam’s desire to include the Paracel Islands (known as Xisha in China and Hoang-Sa in Vietnam), which China rejects. Furthermore, the definition of an “incident”—whether it includes coast guard water cannon missions, supply vessel blockades, or strictly military force—remains controversial. Heiduk emphasized that these details will determine whether the code is effective or remains merely a non-binding declaration.
Internal Divisions and Future Outlook
Ufen views China’s stance as a strategic calculation to keep the conflict simmering without binding legal regulations, thereby strengthening Beijing’s position while preserving its maneuverability. Simultaneously, internal divisions plague the 11-member ASEAN group, where nations like the Philippines and Vietnam firmly oppose China, Malaysia and Indonesia adopt restrained approaches, and Cambodia and Laos maintain close economic ties with Beijing without territorial claims.
Heiduk pointed out that ASEAN’s consensus principle allows any member state to block unified positions, a problem exacerbated by recurring confrontations between China and the Philippines. A study by the Singapore-based Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) suggests that internal divisions alongside China have stalled negotiations, recommending partial agreements on crisis communication, rescue operations, or environmental protection as potential intermediate steps.
Heiduk warned that even a signed code would not eliminate underlying territorial disputes and competing maritime claims. The American Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded after the Manila summit that the hardest sticking points remain unresolved, leaving negotiations to continue in 2027 under Singapore’s chairmanship.








